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VERY LIKE A LAW PROFESSOR: AN 
ESSAY IN HONOR OF TOM ULEN 
Ian Ayres* 
This Essay explores the future of law and economics.  The au-
thor begins by reviewing Tom Ulen’s attempts at predicting the field’s 
future in 1997 at his lecture “Very Like a Whale.”  He then follows 
Tom Ulen’s idea that law and economics scholars might do well to 
engage in more “controlled experiments” to make his own set of pre-
dictions.  His first prediction is that law and economics scholars dur-
ing the next decade will exploit regression discontinuity to tease out 
the causal impact of legal rules.  Next, he predicts that law and eco-
nomics scholars will exploit unintended experiments to tease out 
causal impacts of the law.  Finally, the author predicts that law and 
economics scholars will, with the help of government officials, con-
duct intentional experiments to tease out causal impacts of the law. 
 
Tom Ulen is one of the great pioneers of law and economics.  He, 
along with William Landes, Mitch Polinsky, Al Klevorick, and Steve 
Shavell represent the first wave of PhD economists teaching in law 
schools and publishing in law reviews.  Tom has contributed to a wide 
swath of subject matters and methodologies.1  He is also one of the great 
expositors of law and economics.  Through multiple editions of their 
seminal textbook, Law and Economics, Robert Cooter and Tom Ulen 
have indoctrinated thousands of law students (and undergraduates) in 
the ways of the rational actor model.  Their textbook is that rare publica-
tion that clearly recasts the seminal findings of the field, while adding to 
the field with additional contributions of their own.  For example, in ana-
lyzing disclosure law, Tony Kronman is responsible for making the dis-
tinction between deliberately and casually acquired information in his 
deservedly famous Laidlaw article.2  But it is the Cooter and Ulen text-
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 1. Two of my favorite Tom Ulen ideas concern comparative negligence: Robert D. Cooter & 
Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067 (1986); and 
behavioral economics: Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Remov-
ing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000). 
 2. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 9–14 (1978). 
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book that makes the equally important distinction between information 
that is socially productive (in that it increases the gains of trade) and in-
formation that is merely redistributive (in that it redistributes the gains 
from one party in a contract to another).3 
Yet Tom means more to me and to his colleagues at the University 
of Illinois as well as those throughout the academy than what he has put 
down on paper.  It was Tom who taught me that part of his job was ac-
tually spending time socializing with his colleagues.  When I visited at the 
University of Illinois for one year, Tom and I—under the pretext of pre-
paring for a law and economics class we were coteaching—spent loads of 
time together.  Our out of class interactions were often centered around 
food or sports.  It was Tom who first took me to the Champaign break-
fast tradition that is Carmon’s (some lingering grease in my bowels 
turned when I learned it had been turned into a crêperie).  It was Tom 
who one day whisked me away to bustling Philo, Illinois to enjoy the 
equally healthful offerings of the Philo Tavern.  And, it was Tom who 
repeatedly treated me to Jarling’s Custard Cup.   
On the sports side, beyond negotiating several aleatory agreements, 
Tom and I regularly played racquetball together—that is, until Tom saw 
me blow out my knee while we were teammates on the faculty’s Old ‘N 
Slow basketball team.  (A note to young scholars: when playing on the 
faculty team as a visiting professor, the number of times you are fed the 
ball is a signal of how heavily you are being recruited.)  Tom and his son 
Tim are witnesses to the closest thing I’ll ever have to a dunk—on a 
slightly depressed rim at the Doctor Howard school court across from his 
house.  Tim was more surprised to see me show up unannounced at the 
Ulen home with a six pack of beer to watch the defeat of some woe-
begotten Indiana team.  At the beginning of my visiting year, Tom 
picked me up at my house at 4 AM to partake in one of the weirdest and 
most wonderful Illinois traditions (going back almost as long as the Mor-
row Plots) of waiting in line for prime locker space at the IMPE sports 
center.  I remember Tom not only brought coffee, but he brought his 
characteristic bonhomie and turned what would have been drudgery into 
a wonderful memory of communing with Tom, Russell Korobkin, and 
Tom Mengler.  Tom thought that we should see the early morning event 
as law and economics in action.  After all, when an institution decides to 
allocate a scarce entitlement on a nonprice basis, it is only natural that 
we should expect to see people substitute queuing costs for out of pocket 
costs. 
                                                                                                                                      
 3. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 246–48 (2d ed. 1997).  
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I. TESTING ULEN’S PAST PREDICTIONS OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS’ FUTURE 
I’ve been asked today to speak about the future of law and econom-
ics.  But before attempting my own prognostication, I thought I would go 
back to 1997 to review Tom’s own attempts at predicting the field’s fu-
ture.  I was sitting in the audience here at the University of Illinois Col-
lege of Law when Tom delivered “Very Like a Whale,” an inaugural lec-
ture on the occasion of his receiving a chair as one of Illinois’s Alumni 
Distinguished Professors of Law.4  The third section of those remarks ex-
pressly “speculate[d] on the future of law and economics.”5  My goal here 
is to look back and assess whether Tom got it right.  I read Tom’s speech 
as having made four predictions, which I will now describe and try to 
score for accuracy. 
A. Declining Impact  
As a preliminary matter, Tom predicted that the low-hanging fruit 
had already been picked: 
The easy work in law and economics has been done.  The field has 
now settled into a comfortable middle age; its hair is graying nicely 
at the temples.  The work that lies in the future is likely to be far 
more complex and to have a much smaller payoff than the earlier 
work. . . . I doubt that there will be similar significant impacts of law 
and economics in the near future . . . .6 
This is not the rosiest of predictions, but the past thirteen years have not 
proven him wrong.  The field is thriving, but to my knowledge no line of 
recent scholarship has had the impact of say, the Chicago school’s trans-
formation of antitrust analysis.  Oh, to have had virgin lands to plow for 
the very first time! 
B. More Econometrics 
Tom looked to the expanded use of econometrics as an important 
source of discovering the underlying impact of the law: 
I think that the next large leaps are likely to come from empir-
ical work.  By this I mean the sort of sophisticated econometrics 
and statistical hypothesis-testing that [a few scholars] in law and 
economics have engaged in.  To do this work and to evaluate it, will 
demand of those in the field that they become adept in skills that 
are not now part of the common toolkit of the legal scholar.  Signif-
icantly, it will also require of law and economics that it quit acting 
                                                                                                                                      
 4. See generally Thomas S. Ulen, Very Like a Whale: Inaugural Lecture for the Alumni Distin-
guished Professor of Law (Oct. 15, 1997), http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/WP62-whale.pdf. 
 5. Id. at 10. 
 6. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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like a religion and more like a science.  Practitioners will have to 
leave the cathedral and get to the microscope.7 
There are, I am well aware, significant inherent problems in doing 
empirical work in the law.  To give you one example, anyone eager to 
measure the deterrent effect of tort law must be able to demonstrate the 
accidents that did not happen because of fear of tort liability and that the 
accidents that did occur were less severe than they otherwise would have 
been.  These are very demanding things to demonstrate. 
One possibility for broadening the scope of empirical work in law 
and economics is to rely more on controlled experiments.  These have 
proved to be extremely revealing in psychology and, as Russell Korobkin 
has shown, in law, too.8  Once again, Ulen was prescient.  There has been 
a marked uptick in legal number crunching.  There was a time when the 
law and society conference was the home of the best legal empiricism.  
Today, law and economics conferences (ALEA, CELS, or the NBER 
summer workshop) are the dominant purveyors of quantitative analysis.  
And, as I will suggest, Tom’s prediction about the opportunity “to rely 
more on controlled experiments” is still true today and a central part of 
my current predictions. 
C. More Complex Models  
Tom also predicted increasingly nuanced and high-powered math-
ematical models: 
[W]e are likely to find ourselves using ever-more sophisticated 
models.  For instance, chaos theory may come to play an important 
role in the law.  Let me explain why.  In 1812 Pierre Simon de Lap-
lace argued that if we knew enough, we could predict the future ex-
actly.  One way of putting this is to say that, if we knew the initial 
conditions of a system perfectly and if we knew the laws of motion 
of the system, then we should be able to predict its state at any fu-
ture point in time.  This Laplacian determinism is correct only if we 
can measure the initial conditions with infinite precision.  But, of 
course, we cannot and the effects of this imprecision can be dramat-
ic.9 
Suppose that you were able to measure the initial condition of a sys-
tem to ten decimal places.  That sounds fairly accurate, but clearly it is a 
long way from complete accuracy.  If we make predictions about the fu-
ture states of the system on the basis of our ten-decimal-place initial con-
dition, errors compound and compound fairly quickly.  The result is that 
our predictions about the future may be wildly inaccurate or, put some-
what differently, this system of equations will be extremely sensitive to 
                                                                                                                                      
 7. Id. at 11. 
 8. Id. at 10–11. 
 9. Id. at 11 (footnotes omitted). 
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initial conditions.  A system with that property is said to be “chaotic.”  
But the term is slightly misleading.  “Chaos” is apparently complicated, 
apparently patternless behavior that actually has a simple, deterministic 
explanation. 
The discovery of chaos has revealed a fundamental misunder-
standing in our views of the relation between rules and the behavior 
they produce—between cause and effect.  “We used to think that 
deterministic causes must produce regular effects, but now we see 
that they can produce highly irregular effects that can easily be mis-
taken for randomness.  We used to think that simple causes must 
produce simple effects (implying that complex effects must have 
complex causes), but now we know that simple causes can produce 
complex effects.  We realize that knowing the rules is not the same 
as being able to predict future behavior.”  For our purposes in pre-
dicting the effects of legal rules on behavior, we can see that we 
need terribly sophisticated models of human behavior that recon-
cile the unpredictability of behavior with simple, deterministic 
models.10 
Here is (finally) a prediction that has not borne fruit.  To be sure, dozens 
of articles with high-tech models of contracting and positive political 
theory have been written.  Indeed, a journal I edited for seven years 
since Tom’s prognostication takes some pride in publishing some of the 
more sophisticated efforts.11  But Tom’s suggestions about chaos theory 
have not materialized.  SSRN tells me it has 374 abstracts that use the 
term,12 but few law and economics scholars would identify anything close 
to chaos theory as having traction in the field. 
I should disclose, however, that this assessment might be subject to 
an “anchoring” bias.13  You see, in the question and answer after the 1997 
lecture, I challenged Tom about the plausibility of this prediction.  At the 
time, I viewed chaos as an analysis that couldn’t be used to go beyond 
the suggestion of perverse possibilities.  I didn’t think it could be turned 
into a tool to make falsifiable real-world predictions.  Tom pivoted to ar-
guing that non-neoclassical models—such as those with increasing re-
turns—would be increasingly prevalent.  I was still skeptical, but Tom 
masterfully forced me to comment on a work in progress by Daria 
Roithmayr that argued how “lock-in” effects illuminate civil rights analy-
sis.  In fact, Tom somehow managed to orchestrate a bet between Daria 
                                                                                                                                      
 10. Id. at 12 (footnotes omitted). 
 11. The journal that I am referring to is The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 
 12. SSRN eLibrary Database Search, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
DisplayAbstractSearch.cfm (accessed by running search for “chaos”) (last visited June 26, 2011). 
 13. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing 
Illusion, 312 SCIENCE 1908, 1908 (2006) (“When people consider the impact of any single factor on 
their well-being . . . they are prone to exaggerate its importance.  We refer to this tendency as the fo-
cusing illusion.”). 
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and me, which I lost when her analysis was subsequently published in the 
Virginia Law Review.14 
D. More Behavioral Economics  
Finally, Tom saw a future with increased attention to departures 
from the traditional rational actor model: 
The . . . general direction in the future of law and economics 
will be a theory of human decision-making that is vastly more satis-
fying than rational choice theory.  That theory must give us an ac-
count of the fallibility of human reason, something we know exists 
but about which we are only just beginning to have systematic 
learning.  It is, I think, one of the truly astonishing things about law 
and economics that some of the most important theoretical innova-
tions in economic theories of behavior are occurring among law-
and-economics scholars, not among mainstream economists.  Why 
did this happen?  Because, I believe, the lawyers’ very practical and 
sharp questions about human behavior have demanded a coherent 
response.  Law and economics has been goaded into providing that 
response and, in the course of doing so, has significantly emended 
our understanding of human behavior.15 
Tom’s future vision is 20/20 here.  The past decade has seen a flowering 
of behavioralism.  Of course, it is a bit unfair to give Tom too much cred-
it for this prediction, because his own ensuing scholarship made it come 
true.16  In 1997, I recognized that behavioralism was at least a fad; but I 
would not have predicted the extent to which I would become a fellow 
traveler in some of my own writing.17   
 So in sum, I score Tom at an enviable 3.5 out of 4—taking off just a 
half point for his chaos prediction.  Then again, knowing Tom, he may 
just be setting me up to lose another bet to Daria or some other budding 
chaos scholar.  In 2023, if someone comes back and assesses the next sec-
tion, I doubt if history will look as kindly on my three soothsayings. 
  
                                                                                                                                      
 14. See generally Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimina-
tion, 86 VA. L. REV. 727 (2000). 
 15. Ulen, supra note 4, at 12. 
 16. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1. 
 17. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET 
THINGS DONE (2010); Ian Ayres et al., Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer Com-
parison Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage (July 16, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434950. 
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II. THE RANDOMIZATION LENS  
My predictions all follow from Tom’s 1987 idea that law and eco-
nomics scholars might do well to engage in more “controlled experi-
ments.”  Since then, empirical economists have increasingly thought 
about empiricism in terms of randomized experiments.18  This shift in 
thinking can be seen in the methodological shift of emphasis between the 
phenomenally successful Freakonomics which was published in 2005 and 
the 2009 sequel, SuperFreakonomics. 
Freakonomics focused on the crunching of historical data.  For ex-
ample, a core story of the original book looked at data on crime and 
abortion.19  In a truly inspired moment, John Donohue and Steve Levitt 
thought to link the impact of legalizing abortion to the incidence of 
crime—eighteen years later.  Mining historic data can produce truly star-
tling results. 
But a higher proportion of SuperFreakonomics is devoted to studies 
that use randomized field experiments to find out what causes what.  If 
you want to know whether offering donors a two-for-one matching grant 
produces more charitable donations than a one-for-one grant, you ran-
domly assign potential donors to receive one of these two solicitations 
and then look to see whether the two groups give different amounts.  
One sign of the shift toward randomization is the prominence of John 
List and his rise to fame in the economics profession.  John is one of the 
great field experimenters in economics today.  He is the kind of guy who 
goes to baseball card shows and at random treats one set of card dealers 
differently from another and then sees whether they offer different 
prices.  
SuperFreakonomics not only relates the results of more randomized 
experiments than Freakonomics did, it also explains how the idea of ran-
domized experiments is leading statisticians to think more clearly about 
how to use regression analysis to test for causal effects with historic data.  
There is a new zeitgeist in the way economists think about running re-
                                                                                                                                      
 18. This section develops ideas that I first blogged about in 2009.  Ian Ayres, A New Method to 
the Freakonomics Madness, FREAKONOMICS: THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (Dec. 8, 2009, 2:30 
PM), http://freakonomics.com/2009/12/08/a-new-method-to-the-freakonomics-madness/; Ian Ayres, So 
Long and Thanks for All the F-Tests, FREAKONOMICS (June 30, 2009, 12:22 PM), http://freakonomics. 
com/2009/06/30/so-long-and-thanks-for-all-the-f-tests/.  Since delivering this paper at the live confer- 
ence, Jim Greiner and Cassandra Pattanayak have circulated the initial results of a remarkable ran-
domized experiment with evidence showing that offers for free legal representation from the Harvard 
Legal Aid Bureau (HLAB) ended up hurting unemployment claimants.  D. James Greiner & Cassan-
dra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: Report of a First Study, a Critical 
Review of the Literature, and Prospects for the Future, 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2011).  See also Ian 
Ayres, Iatrogenic Legal Assistance?, FREAKONOMICS: THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (Dec. 28, 
2010, 1:30 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2010/12/28/iatrogenic-legal-assistance/. 
 19. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST 
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 115–44 (2005); see also John J. Donohue III & Steven 
D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 116 Q.J. ECON. 379 (2001). 
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gressions.  Today, statistical economists explicitly think of their regres-
sions in terms of randomized experiments.  They think of the variable of 
interest as the “treatment” and ask themselves what kind of assumptions 
they need to make or what kind of statistical procedures they need to run 
on the historic data to emulate a randomized study.  
This new way of thinking is very much on display in the truly excel-
lent (but technically demanding) book, Mostly Harmless Econometrics: 
An Empiricist’s Companion, by Joshua Angrist and Jörn-Steffen 
Pischke.20  Angrist and Pischke unabashedly claim that when properly 
specified, regression correlation estimates can provide evidence of the 
econometric Holy Grail, causation: 
[Something that distinguishes] the discipline of econometrics 
from the older sister field of statistics . . . is a lack of shyness about 
causality.  Causal inference has always been the name of the game 
in applied econometrics.  Statistician Paul Holland (1986) cautions 
that there can be “no causation without manipulation,” a maxim 
that would seem to rule out causal inference from nonexperimental 
data.  Less thoughtful observers fall back on the truism that “corre-
lation is not causality.”  Like most people who work with data for a 
living, we believe that correlation can sometimes provide pretty 
good evidence of a causal relation, even when the variable of inter-
est has not been manipulated by a researcher or experimenter.21 
The book backs up this assertion by teaching the reader to think careful-
ly about what assumptions about the counter factual are necessary to 
make a causal inference.  The key condition that is necessary to infer 
cause from correlation is that the historical data must emulate the condi-
tions of randomized data.   
For example, Angrist and Pischke show that the regression discon-
tinuity design provides causal inference from historic correlation because 
it emulates randomized assignment of a treatment to otherwise similar 
subjects.22 
1) I predict that law and economics scholars during the next decade will 
exploit regression discontinuity to tease out the causal impact of legal 
rules. 
To see how regression discontinuity works and why it is ripe for ex-
ploitation, let me sketch how it might be applied to assessing the impact 
of sentencing enhancements for drunk driving.  In California, it is illegal 
to drive with a blood alcohol level above .08, but driving with a blood al-
                                                                                                                                      
 20. See generally JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS 
ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION (2009). 
 21. See id. at 113 (footnote omitted). 
 22. Id. at 251–67 (regarding regression discontinuity). 
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cohol level above .15 may subject a driver to enhanced penalties.23  A re-
gression discontinuity can be used to tease out the causal impact of the 
penalty enhance on recidivism (or potentially a host of other outcomes, 
such as unemployment or suicide).  The key to regression discontinuity is 
to restrict the sample to the arrestees who are arbitrarily close to the en-
hancement discontinuity.  Arrestees whose blood alcohol level is .1499 
and those whose level is .1501 should be nearly identical on every other 
dimension.  We should expect that those above and below the cutoff 
would have the same proportion of felons and the same proportion of 
oboists.  Seen through the “randomization lens,” it is largely random 
whether a particular person in this restricted sample will be measured as 
being above or below the enhancement cutoff.  For this restricted sam-
ple, it is as if some arrestees were randomly selected for the enhancement 
treatment.  And from there it is a short step to realizing that a regression 
discontinuity can test, again in the restricted sample, whether the en-
hancement reduces the risk of recidivism. 
Discontinuity regressions are often not feasible.  There needs to be 
a discontinuous treatment for people who are above or just below some 
cutoff.  But the law abounds with such continuity (such as when parole 
boards produce a continuous risk assessment rating and then choose 
whether or not to parole).  Even when there is a cutoff, the discontinuity 
design will not work if the subjects strategically react to the assessment.  
Discontinuity regressions are less appropriate to assess the causal impact 
of speeding laws because drivers strategically may choose to drive just 
below a speeding enhancement.  In contrast, I find it less likely that 
drunk drivers are able to strategically manipulate their blood alcohol lev-
els so that they are just below .14. 
Keith Chen and Jesse Shapiro lead the way here with a wonderful 
discontinuity analysis of the effect of prison conditions on recidivism 
rates.24  Additionally, Kenneth Y. Chay and Michael Greenstone utilize a 
discontinuity model in order to isolate the specific conditions within the 
housing market and their effect on air quality in certain communities.25 
What Economists Would Really Like to Do  
SuperFreakonomics very much reflects this new randomization lens 
as a way of thinking about data mining.  Without off-putting jargon,  
Levitt and Dubner explain how regressions can give you quasi experi-
mental results.  Indeed, with help from my Kindle, I found three parallel 
                                                                                                                                      
 23. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23578 (West 2011).  Miguel Figueirdo is currently working on producing 
just such a discontinuity study analyzing a variety of states. 
 24. See generally M. Keith Chen & Jesse M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison Conditions Reduce Re-
cidivism? A Discontinuity-Based Approach, 9 AM. L. ECON. REV. 1 (2007). 
 25. See generally Kenneth Y. Chay & Michael Greenstone, Does Air Quality Matter? Evidence 
from the Housing Market, 113 J. POL. ECON. 376 (2005). 
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descriptions that turn on making the randomization analogy.  For exam-
ple, listen to how they describe testing for sex discrimination on the job: 
Economists do the best they can by assembling data and using 
complex statistical techniques to tease out the reasons why women 
earn less than men.  The fundamental difficulty, however, is that 
men and women differ in so many ways.  What an economist would 
really like to do is perform an experiment, something like this: take 
a bunch of women and clone male versions of them; do the reverse 
for a bunch of men; now sit back and watch.  By measuring the la-
bor outcomes of each gender group against their clones, you could 
likely gain some real insights. 
Or, if cloning weren’t an option, you could take a bunch of 
women, randomly select half of them, and magically switch their 
gender to male, leaving everything else about them the same, and 
do the opposite with a bunch of men. 
Unfortunately, economists aren’t allowed to conduct such ex-
periments. (Yet.)26 
They go on to describe how, in the absence of randomized data, some 
(limited) progress might be gleaned by looking at the historic experience 
of transgendered people—before and after sex reassignment surgery.  
They take a similar approach when tackling the question of testing physi-
cian quality: 
What you’d really like to do is run a randomized, controlled 
trial so that when patients arrive they are randomly assigned to a 
doctor, even if that doctor is overwhelmed with other patients or 
not well equipped to handle a particular ailment. 
But we are dealing with one set of real, live human beings who 
are trying to keep another set of real, live human beings from dying, 
so this kind of experiment isn’t going to happen, and for good rea-
son. 
Since we can’t do a true randomization, and if simply looking 
at patient outcomes in the raw data will be misleading, what’s the 
best way to measure doctor skill? 
Thanks to the nature of the emergency room, there is another 
sort of de facto, accidental randomization that can lead us to the 
truth.27 
The “next in line” queue at some emergency rooms provides quasi ran-
dom assignments and allows researchers to emulate the results on a ran-
domized test.  The magic “really like to do” words appear a third time 
when Levitt and Dubner talk about testing whether more incarceration 
would really lower the crime rate: 
                                                                                                                                      
 26. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, SUPERFREAKONOMICS: GLOBAL COOLING, 
PATRIOTIC PROSTITUTES AND WHY SUICIDE BOMBERS SHOULD BUY LIFE INSURANCE 47 (2009). 
 27. Id. at 78–79. 
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To answer this question with some kind of scientific certainty, 
what you’d really like to do is conduct an experiment.  Pretend you 
could randomly select a group of states and command each of them 
to release 10,000 prisoners.  At the same time, you could randomly 
select a different group of states and have them lock up 10,000 
people, misdemeanor offenders perhaps, who otherwise wouldn’t 
have gone to prison.  Now sit back, wait a few years, and measure 
the crime rate in those two sets of states.  Voilà!  You’ve just run 
the kind of randomized, controlled experiment that lets you deter-
mine the relationship between variables. 
Unfortunately, the governors of those random states probably 
wouldn’t take too kindly to your experiment.  Nor would the people 
you sent to prison in some states or the next-door neighbors of the 
prisoners you freed in others.  So your chances of actually conduct-
ing this experiment are zero. 
That’s why researchers often rely on what is known as a natu-
ral experiment, a set of conditions that mimic the experiment you 
want to conduct but, for whatever reason, cannot.  In this instance, 
what you want is a radical change in the prison population of vari-
ous states for reasons that have nothing to do with the amount of 
crime in those states. 
Happily, the American Civil Liberties Union was good enough 
to create just such an experiment.28 
The methodological repetition across these examples is one of the book’s 
strengths.  This is really the way that many empirical economists talk to 
themselves about testing.  Regardless of the problem, we often now start 
with the same basic question: Can we trick a regression to emulate the 
conditions of a randomized experiment?  As the randomization zeitgeist 
of economics departments diffuses to law schools, we should expect an 
uptick in the way the randomization lens impacts the ways law and eco-
nomics scholars construct and specify their regressions of historic data. 
But randomization is more than just a metaphor. 
  
                                                                                                                                      
 28. Id. at 100–01. 
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2) I predict that law and economic scholars will exploit unintended 
experiments to tease out causal impacts of the law. 
 
Circuit Selection is a Crap Shoot 
One of the juiciest pieces of low hanging fruit available for quantita-
tive scholars to pick concerns data in which institutions used randomized 
procedures to promote fairness or other organizational objectives.  Want 
to find out the impact of serving in the military on lifetime earnings?  
Scholars have exploited the simple fact that the Vietnam draft lottery 
randomly selected some young men for military service.29  The United 
States didn’t set up the lottery as an experiment to test for the impacts of 
military service.  But nonetheless, researchers can come in after the fact 
and piggyback on the randomization procedure to estimate the causal 
impact. 
Piggybacking studies have exploited the random assignment of 
roommates at Dartmouth and other schools to show that peers influence 
your GPA, your drinking, and whether you’ll join a fraternity.30  A re-
cently published study of random class assignment at the U.S. Air Force 
Academy suggests being assigned to a female professor “has a power- 
ful effect on female students’ performance in math and science 
classes . . . .”31 
Consideration of fairness and transparency often drive legal 
processes toward explicitly randomized (or quasi-randomized) queuing 
procedures and thus are a fertile ground for piggyback analyses.  Donald 
Green and Daniel Winik have exploited the random assignment of 
                                                                                                                                      
 29. Carlos Dobkin & Reza Shabani, The Health Effects of Military Service: Evidence from the 
Vietnam Draft, 47 ECON. INQUIRY 69 (2009). 
 30. Bruce Sacerdote, Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates, 
116 Q.J. ECON. 681 (2001); Natalie J. Shook & Russell H. Fazio, Roommate Relationships: A Compari-
son of Interracial and Same-Race Living Situations, 11 GRP. PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 425 
(2008). 
 31. Scott E. Carrell et al., Sex and Science: How Professor Gender Perpetuates the Gender Gap, 
125 Q.J. ECON. 1101, 1104 (2010). 
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judges to disputes to test whether a criminal judge impacts recidivism.32  
David Abrams and Albert Yoon have exploited the random assignment 
of public defenders in Clark County, Nevada, and found that veteran 
public defenders with more than ten years of experience reduce the av-
erage length of incarceration by seventeen percent compared to public 
defenders in their first year; additionally, Hispanic attorneys obtained 
sentences that were up to twenty-six percent shorter than those obtained 
by African American and white attorneys.33  I hope to exploit the random 
assignment of cellmates to test whether bunking with a more serious fel- 
on impacts the types of crimes a parolee is likely to commit in the future.  
Dan Ho and Kosuke Imai have exploited California’s randomized ballot 
alphabet to find that a candidate having his or her name appear first in-
creases the expected vote share in primary elections (but not general 
elections where party cues are more important).34 
There are still fine careers to be made simply by searching for and 
then analyzing preexisting randomization procedures.  For example, you 
might be surprised to learn that 28 U.S.C. § 2112 provides for a random-
ized mechanism for resolving intercircuit conflicts arising from multiple 
appellate proceedings arising out of a single administrative proceeding.35  
The statute requires that agencies notify the Judicial Panel on Multidis- 
trict Litigation (JPML) if multiple petitions for review of an agency ac-
tion are filed in different judicial districts.  If the JPML determines that it 
should consolidate the cases, the statute requires that it choose the venue 
from among the circuits where timely petitions were filed “by means of 
random selection.”36  The JPML has promulgated implementing rules re-
quiring “the Clerk of the Panel or designated deputy [to] randomly select 
a circuit court of appeals from a drum containing an entry for each circuit 
wherein a constituent petition for review is pending. . . . This random se-
lection shall be witnessed by the Clerk of the Panel or a designated depu-
ty other than the random selector.”37  In fact, the picture above is the ac-
tual drum used by the JPML in making selections.  Do circuits decide 
                                                                                                                                      
 32. Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments to Estimate the Effects 
of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 357 (2010).  
See also IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE 
SMART 72 (2007).  
 33. David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case Assignment 
to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2007). 
 34. Daniel E. Ho & Kosuke Imai, Randomization Inference with Natural Experiments: An Anal-
ysis of Ballot Effects in the 2003 California Recall Election, 101 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 888 (2006). 
 35. DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL § 1:1 (Thomson Reuters/West, 
2009). 
 36. 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3) (2006).  The discussion of this procedure is derived from Paul R.  
Rodriguez, Seeding the Courts: Strategic Appeals in Complex Litigation an Empirical Look at the 
Randomization Procedures of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (2009) (unpublished man- 
uscript) (on file with author). 
 37. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION R. 17.1, at 
14 (Apr. 2, 2001), http://www.classactionlitigation.com/mdl/MDLR.PDF. 
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cases differently?  Thanks to this drum, we may one day have at least the 
beginnings of an answer. 
3) I predict that law and economics scholars will, with the help of 
government officials, conduct intentional experiments to tease out 
causal impacts of the law. 
Of course, a researcher can only piggyback if there is preexisting 
randomization to analyze.  In the more common circumstance, the re-
searcher needs to secure the cooperation of the organization to randomly 
treat similar cases differently.  Randomized treatment is neither arbitrary 
nor capricious because it is not driven by whim or animus but as an at-
tempt to resolve uncertainty about what works best.  In many ways, the 
governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in developing 
nations have shown a greater willingness than those in so-called devel-
oped nations to undertake rigorous randomized testing.  I highlight many 
examples of such field studies of public policy in my book, Super 
Crunchers.38  I’ve never mentioned it before, but it strikes me that an 
Oxbridge connection is often behind these studies.  Young executives 
and administrators in the participating organizations often attended elite 
research universities such as Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, or MIT and 
come home with zeal to put randomization into practice. 
And in spreading the randomization revolution, it may help that we 
are living in an era of substantial methodological advances.  It is an un-
usual and heartening sign that in 2006 a law professor, Anup Malani, 
published a lead article in the Journal of Political Economy unveiling a 
powerful new procedure for estimating the size of Placebo and Nocebo 
effects.39  Malani’s wickedly smart idea was to vary the probability of 
treatment for different groups of subjects and tell the subjects about 
these different probabilities.40  For example, imagine that one group of 
patients is (honestly) told they have a ninety percent chance of receiving 
a statin pill and ten percent chance of receiving a placebo pill.  Another 
group of patients might be told (honestly) that they have a twenty per-
cent chance of a statin.  After the experiment is completed for both 
groups, it is then possible to compare the reported side effects of those 
patients in both groups that happened to receive statins.  The only differ-
ence between these two groups is that one group thought it had a much 
higher probability of receiving a statin.  This is the kind of methodologi-
cal breakthrough that gives lie to any strong form idea that all the big 
ideas are part of an earlier age.  The randomization lens is still relatively 
                                                                                                                                      
 38. AYRES, supra note 32, at 73–80. 
 39. Anup Malani, Identifying Placebo Effects with Data from Clinical Trials, 114 J. POL. ECON. 
236 (2006). 
 40. See id. at 238–39. 
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new and may drive further methodological breakthroughs even with re-
gard to nonrandomized regression analysis. 
There is a natural tendency for a scholar in prognosticating about 
the future of his or her field to say that the next big thing is whatever it 
happens to be that the scholar is about to publish.  But let me play a bit 
against type and predict that lawmakers will not rush to take up the sug-
gestion of Abramowitz, Ayres, and Listokin to randomize statutes, regu-
lations and judge-made legal rules.41  
In a recent article, Michael Abramowicz, Yair Listokin, and I argue: 
Governments should embrace randomized trials to estimate the ef-
ficacy of different laws and regulations.  Just as random assignment 
of treatments is the most powerful method of testing for the causal 
impact of pharmaceuticals, randomly assigning individuals or firms 
to different legal rules can help resolve uncertainty about the con-
sequential impacts of law. . . . Randomization will not be useful for 
all policies, but once government gains better experience with ran-
domization, administrative agencies should presumptively issue 
randomization impact statements justifying decisions to implement 
particular policies.  Making the content of law partially contingent 
on the results of randomized trials will promote ex ante bipartisan 
agreements, as politicians with different empirical predictions will 
tend to think that the experiments will support their position.42 
I am not recanting the normative claims of this Article.  I am only sug-
gesting that as a positive matter the obstacles to embracing the randomi-
zation tool are nontrivial.   
Ceding Control to the Flip of a Coin  
For the last few years, I have pitched the advantage of the randomi-
zation tool to literally of hundreds of private and public organizations.  I 
have had only limited success.  In vain, I have pointed out to a major 
overnight shipper that it does not have a data driven apology policy.  I 
have unsuccessfully proselytized to coaches that they might use randomi-
zation to test which strategies work.43 
I have increasingly come to believe that many decision makers resist 
testing, not simply because they do not want to have their decisions sta-
tistically second guessed, but independently because they have trouble 
allowing particular decisions to be governed by random assignment, by 
the flip of the coin.  We may never know whether twelve-step programs 
                                                                                                                                      
 41. Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (2011). 
 42. Id. at 929–30. 
 43. See Ian Ayres, Why Don’t Sports Teams Use Randomization?, FREAKONOMICS: THE 
HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (Dec. 11, 2007, 11:34 AM), http://freakonomics.com/2007/12/11/why- 
dont-sports-teams-use-randomization-a-guest-post/. 
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actually work, in part, because program administrators are rarely willing 
to cede control to the “higher power” of randomization.44  
But the rest is still unwritten.  Even our outlandish call for “ran- 
domizing law” has some basis in experience.  In 2004, Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) Rule 202T allowed the SEC to implement a 
“pilot program to examine the efficacy” of certain short sale restric-
tions,45 and pursuant to this rule the SEC devised a pilot experiment 
which used a quasi randomizing procedure to exempt one-third of the 
stocks in the Russell 3000 from the short sale restrictions.46  The ex-
empted and unexempted stocks operated under different trading regimes 
from May 2005 to August 2007, providing a significant period for observ-
ing the effects of the short sale restrictions relative to eliminating the re-
strictions.  Because the SEC was willing to randomize the regulation, we 
now for the first time have causal evidence that eliminating short sale re-
strictions would impact some outcome variables (such as short selling  
volumes, which are approximately eight percent less with the restrictions 
than without), but would likely have no effect on bid-ask spreads.47 
If the SEC can successfully experiment on short sale restrictions, 
maybe other lawmakers will one day see their way to running random-
ized control trials to test the impact of other laws.  For my part, I intend 
to do what I can to make these three predictions come to fruition.  Just as 
Tom predicted an upswing in the application of behavioral economics to 
law and then made sure it happened by publishing some himself,48 I hope 
to publish works focusing on discontinuity regressions, and piggyback 
analyses.  And I will continue to preach the randomized control trail 
gospel to decision makers and lawmakers.  
                                                                                                                                      
 44. MARCIA FERRI ET AL., THE COCHRANE COLLABORATION, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS AND 
OTHER 12-STEP PROGRAMMES FOR ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 2 (2009); Banokle A. Johnson, We’re 
Addicted to Rehab.  It Doesn’t Even Work, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/06/AR2010080602660.html. 
 45. OFF. OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE SHORT 
SALE PRICE RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE REGULATION SHO PILOT 3–4 (2007) [hereinafter SEC 
REPORT], http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2007/regshopilot020607.pdf (describing the restrictions). 
 46. As we explain more fully in Randomizing Law: 
The exempted stocks were chosen “by sorting the 2004 Russell 3000 first by listing market [e.g., 
NYSE, NASDAQ] and then by average daily dollar volume from June 2003 through May 2004, 
and then within each listing market selecting every third company starting with the second.  This 
is an example of stratified sampling.  So long as it is effectively random which of the three com-
panies with similar daily trading volumes happens to get exempted from the restrictions, the se-
lection mechanism is equivalent to a stratified randomized experiment.  Note that the SEC’s ex-
perimental design in this case did not seek volunteer companies for different regimes.  Instead, 
the SEC simply chose some companies that would be exempted from the current short-sale re-
strictions. 
Abramowicz et al., supra note 41, at 989 (footnotes omitted). 
 47. SEC REPORT, supra note 45, at 55–56. 
 48. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
HAMLET: Do you see yonder cloud that’s almost in shape of a  
camel? 
POLONIUS: By the Mass and ‘tis, like a camel indeed. 
HAMLET: Methinks it is like a weasel. 
POLONIUS: It is backed like a weasel. 
HAMLET: Or like a whale? 
POLONIUS: Very like a whale.49 
Tom Ulen ended his inaugural lecture in 1997 by explaining why he took 
the title from this bid of dialogue between Hamlet and Polonius: 
[A]n economist teaching in a law school is “very like a whale.”  
She takes on the skills that she needs in order to be valuable to her 
masters and mistresses.  I would extend this trope to subject matter 
areas, too.  Economics is malleable and suitable to the task of 
studying almost any topic within the law. 
. . . In the end, I hope that law and economics will have 
achieved such a position with legal education that when presented 
with a piece of economic analysis of law, the typical response will 
be “Very like the law.”  And that upon observing an economist toil-
ing in legal education, you will say, “Very like a law professor.”50 
One hears in these words some of the obstacles that Tom must have en-
countered in those early years when he had to explain to skeptical col-
leagues and alumni that, even though he lacked a law degree, he was a 
law professor.  Tom’s hopes for the future are, in a sense, two final pre-
dictions that have come true.  Economic analysis has secured an almost 
hegemonic position in the legal academy.51  You are not a top-tier law 
school if you do not have a PhD economist on your faculty.  And Tom 
Ulen is very like a law professor. 
  
                                                                                                                                      
 49. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 2. 
 50. Ulen, supra note 4, at 16. 
 51. See Ian Ayres, Never Confuse Efficiency with a Liver Complaint, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 503, 508 
(describing the hegemony of law and economics as a death star gobbling up the results of other meth-
odologies). 
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